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Comparative Law Colloquium 
The Quiet Revolution 
0 n January !st, 1973 Great 
Britain became a member 
of the European Economic 
Community, ending severa l  de­
cades of  a hesitation waltz marked 
by the tempo of a dithering nation­
alism which still haunts many, and 
makes them wonder whether Great 
Britain will ever play by the rules 
of the game after having waited s o  
long before entering i t  a t  the e n d  of 
the first half. Whatever the future 
holds in store, Great Britain is now 
one of the nine, brought to the 
shores of the European Continent. 
This momentous political event 
stole the limelight away from the 
legal problems which had to flow 
quite inevitably from an economic 
(and political) rapprochement. 
These legal problems draw their 
data from the now well-known dis-
Honon5 Daumier 
tinguishing and dividing features of 
the common law and the civil law, 
and raise the most challenging and 
exciting question of whether these 
two well-entrenched legal families, 
compelled by basic human needs to 
face each other eye to eye, can 
work out a modus vivendi which 
would spare national prides by pre­
serving some elements of their re­
spective historical heritage. Or will 
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the civil law system, carried along 
with the current of the economic 
strength and political power of the 
original six, invade the sacred and 
inflexible boundaries of the com­
mon Jaw tradition and confront di­
rectly the common Jaw lawyer in his 
habits and preferences of heart as 
well as his beliefs of mind and soul? 
Lord Reid has c o nfessed, 
"[w]hat we shall do if we are 
forced into the Common Market 
and have to deal with Continental 
Legislation and decisions I just do 
not know. We shall have t o  learn a 
Jot about not only European Law 
but more important a bout the 
habits of mind of European law­
yers, which I suspect are more the­
oretical and less practical than our 
own." This concern deeply felt and 
expressed under the form of a con­
fession of a bewildering helpless­
n ess reflects the intensity of the 
quiet revolution which is presently 
taking place in Great Britain in the 
area of legal methodology. This 
r evolution pitches against each 
other the civil law and the common 
law approaches to legislation as 
well as their conceptions of the role 
and function of the judge vis-a-vis 
statutory law. 
I. The ci\·il law and common law 
approaches to legislation. 
The divergent approaches to leg­
islation as manifested by these two 
legal traditions relate. first, to the 
place and scope of statutory law as 
a source of law and. secon d. to the 
technique to be followed in drafting 
statutes. In both of these areas of 
d ivergence. European Community 
law falls in the mold of the civil 
law. 
..\. Cfril I.aw and Common Law A.p· 
pma<"/11•.1" lo l.egi.1"/atio11 as a Source of 
I.aw. 
The traditional approach of the 
common law to legislation has al­
ways been one of suspicion and re­
luctant acceptance. an approach 
deeply rooted in the historical past 
of the common law as a "taught 
tradition of decision, a tradition of 
applying judicial experience to the 
decision of controversies, a tradi­
tion shaped in its beginnings as a 
quest for reconciling authority with 
reason, imposed rules with cus­
toms of human conduct, and so the 
universal with the concrete.·· 
(Pound). The British or common 
law judges ··regarded it as danger­
ous and unnatural to prescribe the 
outcome of comparable cases in 
advance by making general regula­
tions to cover the whole area of 
life .... The judges saw statutes as 
being an evil, a necessary evil, no 
doubt, which disturbed the lovely 
harmony of the common law." 
(Zweigert & Kotz by Weir). Even 
today there still exists "the domi­
nant principle, never absent from 
the minds of j udges, that the com­
mon law is wider and more funda­
mental than statute .... The prin­
ciple is e xpressed in the familiar 
rule that statutes 'in derogation of 
the common law· are to be con­
strued strictly." (Allen). "I am 
tempted to take as an analogy the 
difference between old-fashioned, 
hand m a d e, expensive quality 
goods and the brash products of 
modern technology. If you think in 
months, want an instant solution 
for your problems and don't mind 
that it won't wear well, then go for 
legislation. If you think in decades, 
prefer orderly growth and believe 
in the old proverb more haste less 
speed, then stick to the common 
law. But do not seek a middle way 
by speeding up and streamlining 
the development of the common 
law ..  (Lord Reid) .  
The civil law approach t o  the 
role of legisl ation as a source of law 
stands at the antipodes of t h e  
above. I n  those countries which 
claim a common heritage f rom 
: "debris. of the Roman Law [built] into the1r walls" (Sir Henry Maine) 
it is believed that justice as the es-
sence of law i s  best achieved 
through enacted law as the ··sol­
emn expression of legislative will.·· 
(art. I LCCJ. The civil law tradition 
is thus one which vests the su­
preme lawmaking power in a rep­
resentative body a n d  ranks the 
legislative expressio n  of the popu­
lar will at the apex of a pyramid of 
sources of law d e vised and ar­
ranged in a dogmatic and systemat­
ic pattern. "The attitudes that led 
France to adopt the metric system. 
decimal currency. legal codes. and 
a rigid theory of sources of law. all 
in the space of a few years. are still 
basically alien to the common law 
tradition." (Merryman). 
Whether these two opposite ap­
proaches to legislation as a source 
of law are the cause o r  the effect of 
the two obviously different styles 
of drafting statutes is a question 
beyond my purpose here. On this 
occasion I wish to restrict myself to 
a merely objective portrayal of the 
two styles. 
B. The Civil Law and the C 0111111011 Stvles 
of Drafting Statutes. 
. 
Without intending to show any 
disrespect for either of the two 
legal traditions, I be( ieve that one 
could draw a para llel b etween 
cubism and the civil law style on 
the one hand and p ointillism and 
the common law style on the other 
hand. 
The civil law style reflects the 
belief that "the legislator does not 
exercise authority a s  much as he 
serves a sacred office. He must not 
forget that legislation is made for 
men, and that men are not made for 
legislation ... that it is impossible 
to anticipate all the drawbacks that 
practice alone can r ev eal ... that it 
would be absurd to surrender one­
self to a belief in absolute perfec­
tion in matters susceptible of only 
relative goodness ... that to an­
ti
_
cipate everything is a goal i mpos­
sible of attainment." (Portalis). It 
follows from this belief that the 
civil law style of drafting is like ·'a 
monochromatic expression of nat­
ural forms in terms of simplified 
planes and lines and basic geomet­
ric shapes, sometimes organized to 
depict the subject simultaneously 
from several points of view." (Cub­
ism, defined in Webster). The civil 
law style is ·"to set, by taking a 
broad approach, the general propo­
sitions of the law, to establish prin­
ciples which will be fertile in appli­
cation and not to get down to the 
details o f  que stions which may 
arise in particular instances. It is 
for the judge and the jurist. imbued 
with the general spirit of the laws, 
to direct their application ... (Por­
talis). By his style, his technique of 
drafting, the civilian legislator as­
<>ociates the judge in the adminis­
tration of justice in a mutual and 
reciprocal attitude of trust and con­
fidence. 
The common law technique of 
drafting statutes resembles the ex­
treme care and minuteness of a 
Seurat and the school of pointillism 
whose style has been defined as 
'"applying dots or tiny strokes of 
color elements to a surface so that 
when seen from a distance the dots 
or stroke s  blend luminously to­
gether.·· (Pointillism-Webster). 
The common law technique is one 
molded and shaped "by a frame of 
mind w hich habitually looks at 
things in the concrete, not in the 
abstract: which puts faith in ex­
perience rather than in abstrac­
tions ... (Pound). This concern for 
"'realism" is translated into stat­
utes "elaborate to the point of 
complexity: detailed to the point of 
unintelligibility: yet strangely unin­
formative on matters of principle." 
(Lord Justice Scarman). The art of 
legislation had been to ·'pile up as 
many words as possible, significant 
and insignificant, on the chance 
that in their multitude the intention 
of the enactment might find safe­
ty ... (Pollock). "It must be said 
with all respect that one can quite 
often find traces of th is attitude 
even in modern legislation ... 
(Zweigert & Kotz by Weir). "Leg­
islation in detail is resorted to be­
cause Parliamentarians harbour the 
suspicion that Judges cannot be 
trusted to give proper effect to 
clear statements o f  Principle." 
(Lord Emslie and Lord Wheatly). 
C. European Community Law and Legis­
lation. 
In the new l e gal order which 
came into being with the creation 
of the E uropean Economic Com­
munity the normative sources of 
law rank at the top of the pyramid. 
These normative sources include 
the treaties considered as primary 
normative sources of law. and the 
community administrative acts 
such as regulations, directives, and 
decisions, gathered under the 
label of secondary normative 
sources. As far as the decisions of 
the European Court of Justice are 
concerned, it is a fact that the court 
has on many occasions referred to 
and followed its p r evious deci­
sions, although the latter have 
never been considered as binding 
precedents. 
With respect to the style of the 
community normative sources of 
law, although there is no uniform 
pattern on account of the different 
purposes to be achieved by the dif­
ferent lawmaking acts. still there is 
a noticeable common thread run­
ning through them as they emanate 
from institutions. themselves chil­
dren of the founder states all shar­
ing in one common civil law tradi­
tion. This common thread or com­
mon gene has been identified by 
Professor D. Lasok in t hese terms: 
"It can be said, generally, that the 
community legislation follows the 
continental pattern, i.e., translating 
policies into rules of general appli­
cation and proceeding from the 
general to the particular. The Leg­
islation is not as tightly drafted as 
our own statutes, allowing those 
who apply the laws a certain mar­
gin of appreciation in the interpre­
tation of the rules of law ... (Renton 
Report). 
These divergent approaches to 
legislation necessarily carry with 
them in their tracks two basically 
opposite conceptions of the role 
the judges ought to play when con­
fronted with the duty to interpret 
statutory law. It is in this role that 
the British judges may feel like 
aliens called to duty at the service 
of a foreign legal system. 
II. The judges'. role in interpreting 
statutory law and the challenge 
confronting the British judges. 
A. The judges' role of interpreting stat­
utes at civil law and at common law. 
R oscoe Pound has admirably 
synthesized the civil law method of 
interpretation in these words: "The 
civilian is at his best in interpreting. 
developing and applying written 
texts. His method has been one of 
logical development and logical 
exposition of supposedly universal 
enacted propositions. His whole 
tradition is one of the logical han­
dling of written texts." At the turn 
of the 19th century one o f  the 
foremost among the theoreticians 
of the civil law described the 
judge's science as consisting in put­
ting into effect the principles for­
mulate d  by the legislator: "to di­
versify them and to extend them, 
by means of wise and reasoned ap­
plication, to private causes; to 
examine closely the spirit of the 
law when the letter kills; and not to 
expose himself to the risk of being 
alternatively slave and rebel and of 
disobeying because of a servile 
mentality ... (Portal is). Thus, the 
civilian judge, entrusted by the leg­
islator with the deposit of the prin­
ciples most favorable to the com­
mon good, can go about his task to 
consider men as individuals where 
the legislator considered them en 
masse. 
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"The common law lawyer" on 
the other hand "is at his worst 
when confronted with a legislative 
text. His technique is one o f  de­
veloping and applying judicial ex­
perience. It is a technique of find­
ing the grounds of decision in the 
reported cases. It is a technique of 
shaping and reshaping principles 
drawn from recorded judicial deci­
sions.·· (Pound). ·'The force of the 
formulation is spent when the im­
perative in such text is spent. The 
text of the law is its own barrier to 
growth. It is a thing-in-itself and is 
not both thing-in-itself and thing­
for-other. [In] Anglo-American law 
the jurist turns his back on the for­
mulated law when it reaches the 
limit of its command or its instruc­
tion. The received doctrine is that 
judicial determination and not 
legislative formulations are the 
basis for analogical development of 
law ... (Franklin). 
Such were the basic alternatives 
presented to the British courts 
when at last Great Britain bridged 
the gap with the Continent. Having 
to deal with Continental legislation 
and decisions. what would the Brit­
ish judges do" Would the judiciary 
heed the words of Holmes: "if our 
imagination is strong enough to ac­
cept the vision of ourselves as parts 
inseverable from the rest. and to 
extend our final interest beyond the 
boundary of our skins. it justifies 
the sacrifice even of our I iv es for 
ends outside of ourselves""'! 
8. The Briti.<h court.< and European 
Comm1111ity Law. 
The adoption by the British Par­
liament of the European Communi­
ties Act of October 1972. insured 
the supremacy of Community Law 
over the national law of England at 
the same time it made Community 
Law an integral part of the British 
national legal order. Normative 
legal provisions clothed in a civil 
law apparel were to be applied by 
the local judiciary. This challenge 
was accepted, not to say w e l­
comed, by some of the most prom­
inent members of the Brit ish 
bench. H o w  much more civilian 
than the Master of the Rolls can 
one be: 
"When we come to matters with 
a European element, the Treaty 
is like an incoming tide. It flows 
into the estuaries and up the riv­
ers. It cannot be held back. 
We must speak and think o f  
Community law, o f  Community 
rights and obligations, and we 
must give effect to them. This 
means a great effort for the 
lawyers. We have to learn a new 
system. 
What a task is thus set before 
us! The Treaty is quite unlike 
any of the enactments to which 
we have become accustomed. 
The draftsmen of our statutes 
have striven to express them­
selves with the utmost exact­
ness. They have tried to foresee 
all possible circumstances that 
may arise and to provide for 
them. They have sacrificed style 
and simplicity. They have fore­
gone brevity. They have become 
long and involved. 
How different is this Treaty! It 
lays down general principles. It 
expresses its aims and purposes. 
All in sentences of moderate 
length and commendable style. 
But it lacks precision. It uses 
words and phrases without defin­
ing what they mean. An English 
lawyer would look for an in­
terpretation clause, but he would 
look in vain. There is none. All 
the way through the Treaty there 
are gaps and lacunae. These 
have to be filled in by the judges, 
or by regulations or directives. It 
is the European way. What are 
the E nglish courts to do when 
they are faced with a problem of 
interpretation? They must follow 
the European pattern. No longer 
must they examine the words in 
meticulous deta il. No longer 
must they argue about the pre­
cise grammatical s ense. They 
must look to the purpose or in­
tent. If they find a gap. they must 
fill it as best they can. They must 
do what the framers of the in­
strument would have Jone if 
they had thought about it. So we 
must do the same. Those are the 
principles, as I understand it. on 
which the Eur o p e an Court 
acts." 
Two years after the Bollinger case. 
Lord Denning pursued his adven­
turous path into the civil law: 
·'(The members of the European 
Court] adopt a method which 
they call in English by strange 
words-at any rate they were 
strange to me-the ·schematic 
and teleological" method of in­
terpretation. It is not really so 
alarming as it soun ds. All it 
means is that the judges do not 
go by the literal meaning of the 
words or by the gr ammatical 
structure of the sentence. They 
go by the design o r  purpose 
which lies behind it. When they 
come upon a situation which is to 
their minds within the spirit­
but not the letter-of the legisla­
tion, they solve the problem by 
looking at the design and pur­
pose of the legislature-at the ef­
fect which it w a s  sought to 
achieve. They then interpret the 
legislation so as to produce the 
desired effect. This means that 
they fill in g a p s, quite un­
ashamedly, without hesitation. 
They ask simply: w h at is the 
sensible way of dealing with this 
situation so as to give effect to 
the presumed purpose of the 
legislation? They lay down the 
law accordingly. T o  our eyes­
shortsighted by tradition-it is 
legislation, pure and simple. But, 
to their eyes, it is fulfilling the 
true role of the courts. They are 
giving effect to what the legisla-
ture intended, or may be pre­
sumed to have intended. I see 
nothing wrong in this. 
In interpreting the Treaty of 
Rome (which is part of our law) 
we must certainly adopt the new 
approach. Just as in Rome. you 
should do as Rome does. So in 
the European Community, you 
should do as the European Court 
does. Even in interpreting our 
own legislation, we should do 
well to throw aside our tradi­
tional approach and adopt a 
more liberal attitude. We should 
adopt such a construction as will 
·promote the general legislative 
purpose· underlying the provi­
swn. 
These far-reaching exhortations of 
Lord Denning and his followers are 
not shared by all. and more particu­
larly not by several of the Lord Jus­
tices of the House of Lords who 
appear more reticent to go the 
European way: 
·There is no universal wisdom 
available across the Channel 
upon which our insular minds 
can draw. We must use our own 
methods following Lord MacMil­
lan's prescription, taking such 
help as existing decisions give 
us." (Lord Wilberforce). 
Or again, 
"I know of no authority for the 
p ropo sition that one c o nse­
quence of  this country joining 
the European Economic Com­
munity is that the courts of this 
country should now abandon 
principles of construction long 
established in our l a w .  The 
courts have rightly refused to 
encroach on the province of Par­
liament and have refused to en­
gage in legislation. To fill the 
g a p s  which in h i s  o p inion 
existed. Lord Denning rightly 
said. would, in our eyes be 'legis­
lation pure and simple.· " (Vis­
count Dilhorne). 
Is the House of Lords fighting a 
rear guard a c t io n  to surrender 
eventually with honor and dignity? 
"Since it is plainly unsatisfactory 
to combine within one legal system 
two methods of interpretation, one 
of them will have to give way and 
my bet is that the European princi­
ple and practice will prevail. .. 
These words from Lord Justice 
Scarman, a member of the House 
of Lords. are today very close of 
becoming a reality. The wheels of 
reform have been set in motion in 
the domain of legislative drafting in 
answer to evidence· 'that a drafting 
style resulting in readier intelligibil­
ity is a widespread wish in the 
United Kingdom itself and else­
where in the Commonwealth." (Sir 
William Dale). Should the British 
Parliament follow the recommen­
dations m ade by the Renton Report 
and by Sir William Dale in his 
study on ··Legislative Drafting: A 
New Approach," there will take 
place a formal rapprochement be­
tween the common law and the 
civil law systems. This rapproche­
ment will undermine and sap at the 
roots of the traditional common 
law style of drafting statutes with 
the ultimate consequence that the 
"over-rigid adherence to tradition­
al-some might call them 
chauvin i s t-English methods" 
(Lord Justice Roskill) of interpreta­
tion will have to bow to the Euro­
pean Civil Law way. 
I believe that, we. here in Lou­
isiana, might read a message in the 
quiet revolution which is taking 
place in the English common law 
and derive from it a legitimate feel­
ing of pride and comfort. This mes­
sage was actually written two cen-
turies ago by no less than Adam 
Smith, who stood then in the same 
position my dear friend Ferd has 
occupied so many times over the 
years, the position of concerned 
adviser and enlightening guide to 
his students (four of whom are here 
before you today). Ferd could have 
signed the following letter that 
Adam Smith wrote in 1759 in an­
swer to a request for advice sub­
mitted by Lord Shelburne as to the 
proper course of studies his son 
ought to follow: 
" ... 1 would advise him to at­
tend the Lectures of the Profes­
sor of Civil Law: for tho the civil 
law has no authority in the En­
glish courts. the study of it is an 
admirable preparation for the 
study of ye English law. The civil 
law is digested into a more regu­
lar system than the English law 
has yet been, and tho the princi­
ples of the former are in many 
respects different from those of 
the latter. yet there are many 
principles common to both, and 
one who has studied the civil law 
at least knows what a system of 
law is. what parts it consists of, 
and how these ought to be ar­
ranged. So that when he after­
wards comes to study the law of 
any other country which is not so 
well digested. he c arries at least 
the idea of a system in his head 
and knows to what part of it he 
ought to refer every thing that he 
reads .... .
, 
Trained in the heartland of 
Common Law, turned a disciple of 
the Civil Law, transformed into an 
oracle of comparative law, Ferd is 
passing on to us a great heritage. 
The rich and unique legal history of 
our state will never forgive us if we 
accept it only under benefit of in­
ventory. 
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